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State Action is Always Present
Cass R. Sunstein

What is the place of social and economic guarantees in a democratic
constitutional order? Do such guarantees place a special strain on the judiciary? Do
they help poor people? What is the relationship between such guarantees and
doctrines involving state action and the horizontal application of constitutional
norms?
Mark Tushnet does not attempt to answer these questions directly. But he casts
new light on them by analyzing a number of cases in which courts have, or have not,
taken their constitutions to alter background rules of property, contract, and tort.
Tushnet contends that the rise of the activist state, understood as some form of social
democracy, unsettles preexisting understandings of the relationship between
constitutional norms and the private sector. In the classical liberal state, the
constitution does not apply horizontally; there are no economic guarantees; and what
counts as state action is relatively clear. But once the state assumes "affirmative
obligations," constitutional norms might well be triggered, and the state's failure to
alter the background rules of property and contract law might well raise serious
constitutional problems. To borrow from Tushnet's summary of his complex account:
In a "thin social democratic nation," such as Canada, courts are placed in a new and
extremely difficult position, being forced either to "enforce obviously arbitrary lines
between what they treat as state action and what they do not," or to work out "the set
of entitlements people should have in a thicker social democracy."
Much of what Tushnet says is highly illuminating, but I think that there are
several gaps in his discussion. I emphasize two points here. First, the classical liberal
state assumes affirmative obligations, and does so no less than the social democratic
state. The obligations are different, but they are not less affirmative. The widespread
neglect of this point, within the legal and political culture, has led to serious failures in
analysis, and the failures are not innocuous. Second, state action is always present.
*
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The constitutional question, in any system that has a state action requirement, is not
whether there is state action, but whether the relevant state action is unconstitutional.
That is a hard question on the merits, but it is not a hard state action question. A thin
social democracy may struggle with constitutional issues, but by virtue of its status as
a thin social democracy, it ought not to have any special struggle with questions
involving state action or horizontal effect. A nation that currently embraces social
democracy might create, at the constitutional level, social and economic rights, or it
might not. A nation that currently rejects social democracy might offer, at the
constitutional level, social and economic rights, or it might not. The legal questions
involve the merits.
I now offer some details about these two points.
1.The so-called activist state is no more activist than what preceded it. Tushnet speaks of
the "rise of the activist state," which he contrasts with the "classical liberal state." In his2
is defined by the fact that it has affirmative obligations."
view, the "activist state ...
This is the conventional understanding. But the conventional understanding is an
unfortunate way of seeing the relevant categories. Most of the so-called negative rights
require governmental assistance, not governmental abstention. Those rights cannot
exist without public assistance. Consider, for example, the right to private property.
As Bentham wrote, "Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws
were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases."' In the state
of nature, private property cannot exist, at least not in the way that it exists in a free
society. In the state of nature, any property "rights" must be protected either through
self-help-useful to the strong, not to the weak-or through social norms. This form
of protection is far too fragile to support a market economy or indeed the basic
independence of citizens. As we know it, private property is both created and
protected by law; it requires extensive governmental assistance.
The same point holds for the other foundation of a market economy, the close
sibling of private property: freedom of contract. For that form of freedom to exist, it is
extremely important to have reliable enforcement mechanisms in the form of civil
courts. The creation of such mechanisms requires action, not abstention. Nor is the
point-the dependence of rights on public assistance-limited to the foundations of a
market economy. Take, for example, the right to be free from torture and abuse,
perhaps the defining "negative" freedom. Of course it is possible to say this right is a
"negative" safeguard against public intrusion into the private domain. But as a practical
matter, this right requires a state apparatus willing to ferret out and to punish the
relevant rights violations. If the right includes protection against private depredations,
it cannot exist simply with governmental abstention. If the right is limited to
2.
3.

Id at 442 (emphasis in original).
Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 113 (Harcourt, Brace 1931) (C.K. Ogden, ed) (Richard
Hildreth, trans, from Etienne Dumont, ed).
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protection against public abuse of power, it can be satisfied by abstention; but in
practice, abstention from torture and abuse must be guaranteed by a public apparatus
that will deter and punish misconduct. Some rights require the government to protect
against its own rights violations. If we go down the list of conventional private rights,
we will see this same point at every turn.
There is a larger implication, with direct relevance to the question of social and
economic rights. All constitutional rights have budgetary implications; all
constitutional rights cost money.' If the government plans to protect private property,
it will have to expend resources to ensure against both private and public intrusions. If
the government wants to protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures, it
will have to expend resources to train, monitor, and discipline the police. If the
government wants to protect freedom of speech, it must, at a minimum, take steps to
constrain its own agents; and these steps will be costly. It follows that insofar as they
are costly, social and economic rights are not unique.
Now it is possible that such rights are unusually costly. To ensure, for example,
that everyone has housing, it will be necessary to spend more than must be spent to
ensure that everyone is free from unreasonable searches and seizures. But any such
comparisons are empirical and contingent; they cannot be made on an a priori basis.
We could imagine a society in which it costs a great deal to protect private property,
but not so much to ensure basic subsistence.
2. State action is always present, and the real question involves the merits-the meaning of
the relevant constitutionalguarantees. Much discussion of the state action question, and
the "horizontal" application of constitutional norms, seems to me confused, because it
disregards the extent to which the state is present in the arrangements under
challenge. I do not think that Tushnet neglects this point, but I believe that the failure
to recognize it accounts for serious conceptual problems in the United States and in
Canada, and undoubtedly elsewhere.
Suppose, for example, that an employer refuses to hire women, or discharges
people who disclose that they are homosexual. If the employer's acts are challenged on
constitutional grounds, we might ask whether constitutional norms apply to the
employer's action. But we might also ask whether the constitution permits the existing
background law, undoubtedly a product of the state, to authorize the relevant
decisions by the employer. If an employer is discharging people, or refusing to hire
them, and is being allowed to do so, it is not because nature has decreed anything. It is
because the law has allocated the relevant rights to the employer. The legitimacy of
that allocation is a constitutional question to be decided on the merits. We do not
have to worry much about whether there is state action or whether the constitution's
norms apply horizontally.
4.
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To see the point, let us add some more detail, drawing on a contrast to which
Tushnet draws attention. In the first case, a state has no discrimination law, and an
employee is discharged on the ground that she is homosexual. Has the constitution
been violated? To know, we have to know the meaning of the provision on which the
employee is relying. Suppose that it forbids states to deny people the "equal protection
of the laws," or something similar. The question would then be whether the use of
employment law to allow this particular discharge is a violation of that guarantee. If
we conclude that it is not, it might be because the relevant provision does not forbid
the (neutral?) use of employment law to grant employers the power to hire and fire as
they choose.
Now suppose that the government has enacted a law forbidding discrimination
on the basis of race, but not forbidding discrimination on any other ground. Suppose
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is alleged to have occurred. Is the
government, in this case, any more "activist" than in the previous case? I do not believe
so. Is there more likely to be a constitutional violation in this case, holding all else
constant? Referring to Canadian law, Tushnet suggests that the answer is yes. If so, I
think that there are two reasons. The first is that the second statute involves a new
form of discrimination: The state has discriminated, in a sense, against sexual
orientation discrimination, by treating it as more acceptable than race discrimination.
The second reason is that the very existence of the prohibition on race discrimination
shows that the state does not think that the background rules are sacrosanct. It is
willing to compromise them when an antidiscrimination policy justifies the
compromise. And if this is so, then a judicial decision calling for the extension of that
policy would not seem to endanger extremely important social interests. I speculate
that an understanding to this effect also lies behind some of the Canadian decisions.
It is not clear to what extent these points challenge Tushnet's claims. I do not
believe that a "thin social democracy' has any new or special reason to struggle with
questions involving state action, horizontal application, or social welfare rights. Social
democracy or not, thin or not, any constitutional order has to grapple with the
meaning of its fundamental document. A society might repudiate social democracy
entirely, but its constitution, properly interpreted, might require minimum welfare
guarantees or protection against employment discrimination. A society might be, for a
time, a thin social democracy, but it might also be free to abolish welfare entitlements
and face no constitutional obstacles when it allows, or does not allow, employment
discrimination. Tushnet might be right to suggest that there is an empirical
connection between what he (misleadingly) calls an activist state and some of the
conundrums he describes. But I do not believe that there are any logical connections
here. The real question is the merits-the meaning of the constitution.
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One final point. In 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt emphasized that the
exercise of property rights "might so interfere with the rights of the individual that the
Government, without whose assistance the property rights could not exist, must
intervene, not to destroy individualism, but to protect it." In this way, Roosevelt
stressed the omnipresence of state action-the dependence of property rights on
government, without whose assistance the property rights could not exist." I believe
that Roosevelt's emphasis on this point helped pave the way toward his remarkable
endorsement, in 1944, of a Second Bill of Rights, including a wide range of social and
economic guarantees-an endorsement that helped in turn to influence the
development of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and dozens of
constitutions all over the world. But to elaborate this claim would take me well
beyond the present discussion. My principal submissions here are that state action is
always present and that the constitutionality of the relevant action is a question on the
merits-not to be obscured by asking whether a nation's statutory law is committed
to social democracy.

5.
6.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1 The Public Papers and Addresses of FranklinD. Roosevelt 746 (Random House
1938) (Samuel I. Rosenman, comp).
Id.
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